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Notes
Separate Trials on
Liability and Damages in
"Routine Cases": A Legal Analysis
In an effort to combat the problem of delay in the courts
caused by calendar congestion, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently adopt-
ed a local rule which encourages the trial judge to order
a separate trial on liability and damages in personal in-
jury and other civil actions. Opponents of this local rule
have maintained that the employment of such a rule is
not advisable because the rule is not authorized by the
Federal Rules; its effect on jury decisions is not desir-
able; and it is unconstitutional as violative of the seventh
amendment. The author of this Note examines the local
rule and analyzes these objections. He concludes that the
local rule's approach is authorized, desirable, and consti-
tutional.
INTRODUCTION
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois recently adopted local rule 21 which encourages the judge,
in personal injury and other civil litigation, to order separate trials
before the same jury on the issues of liability and damages.' This
rule purports to be pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure which provides that a judge may order a sep-
arate trial on separate issues to further convenience or to avoid
prejudice.2
1. N.D. ILL. Civ. R. 21; 2 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 1048-49 (1960).
Rule 21 has been amended since its adoption. The rule originally author-
ized the employment of a different jury in the second trial on damages. See
4 FED. RuLES SERV. 2d 1136 (1961).
2. The rule was adopted Nov. 9, 1959, pursuant to Rule 83 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which allows "each district court by ac-
tion of a majority of the judges thereof [to] . . . make ...rules gov-
erning its practice not inconsistent with . . . (the Federal] Rules." Rule
83 allows the district courts to set up local rules of procedure to obtain
uniformity on procedures otherwise within the individual discretion of eachjudge.
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Rule 21 is designed to help combat the growing problem of
delay caused by congested court calendars through shortening the
actual time required to try some cases.3 Whether the employment
of rule 21 will reduce delay is not clear; however, this aspect of
the rule has been exhaustively analyzed by various commentators
and will not be dealt with in this Note.' Since delay results in
such erosions of evidence as impaired recall and unavailable wit-
nesses, the merit of rule 21 is obvious if its objective is attained.
However, this local rule may not be authorized by the Federal
Rules. Moreover, the merit of the rule may be overbalanced by its
possible effect on the jury function and jury system; in fact, this
effect may render the rule unconstitutional under the seventh
amendment.
I. RULE 42(b) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RULE 21
A. CURRENT PRACTICE OF ORDERING SEPARATE TRIALS ON
ISSUES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Ordering separate trials on issues is not a new procedure in the
federal courts. Before the Federal Rules were adopted, the equity
side of the courts possessed discretionary power to order separate
trials on various issues,5 and such separate trials were not un-
common.6 The passage of the Federal Rules extended this dis-
cretionary power to all cases, whether legal or equitable. Fed-
3. See Vogel, The Issues of Liability and of Damages in Tort Cases
Should Be Separated for the Purposes of Trial, ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF SEC-
TION OF INS., NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW 265 (1960); Miner,
Court Congestion: A New Approach, 45 A.B.A.J. 1265 (1959).
4. See Brault, Should the Issues of Liability and of Damages in Tort
Cases be Separated for the Purposes of Trial?, 1960 INS. L.J 798; Miner,
supra note 3; Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials:
An Example of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND.
L. REV. 831 (1961); Note, 46 IowA L. REv. 815 (1961).
Statistics indicate that 40% of the personal injury trials are de-
cided for the defendant. See ZEISEL, KALVEN & BUCKHOLZ, DELAY IN
THE COURT 99 (1959). Thus, considerable court time will be saved in 40%
of the cases if rule 21 is employed, for the necessity of arguing damages
in these cases will be eliminated. However, there are many other factors
that must be considered before it can be determined whether rule 21 will ac-
tually reduce delay. Unfortunately, any analysis of rule 21's efficacy must
contain a large amount of speculation. The best policy, therefore, would
appear to be to wait and see whether rule 21 will attain its objective.
5. Equity Rule 29 provided for separate trials on certain defenses. 226
U.S. 656-57 (1912).
6. See, e.g., W. S. Tyler Co. v. Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co., 212 Fed. 156
(2d Cir. 1914); Cleveland Eng'r Co. v. Galion Dynamic Motor Truck Co.,
243 Fed. 405 (N.D. Ohio 1917); Sanitary St. Flushing Mach. Co. v. Stude-
baker Corp., 226 Fed. 797 (D.N.J. 1915).
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eral Rule 42(b) provides that "the court in furtherance of con-
venience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of . . .
any separate issue .... "
Rule 42(b) was derived from two model rules advocated by
the American Judicature Society, the statutes of New York and
California, and Equity Rule 29.' The model rules and the state
statutes all provide for separate trials in conjunction with the ex-
tensive joinder of claims provisions.' This suggests that one pur-
pose of Rule 42(b) is to allow separate trials on issues in cases
that become too complicated.' Separate trials on issues have been
ordered under Rule 42(b) to simplify complex and difficult cases,
and thus avoid the possible prejudice and inconvenience that is
occasionally created by extensive joinder of claims."0 This possible
prejudice and inconvenience is illustrated by the Texas City Dis-
aster Litigation, where 273 suits for damages suffered by 8,485
plaintiffs were consolidated." The court ordered a separate trial
on the issue of liability because taking testimony on all of the
damages would have made a very complex case even more diffi-
7. Advisory Committee Notes to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
United States District Courts, Rule 42, in 3A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 467 (rev. ed. Wright 1958). The Supreme
Court has stated that in ascertaining the meaning of a Federal Rule the
construction given the Rule by the Advisory Committee in their notes "is
of weight." Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444
(1946).
8. CAL. Civ. PRoc. § 1048; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 96; AMERICAN
JUDICATURE SocIETY, BULL. XIV, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 18, 43
(1919). Art. 3, § 2, of the model statutes is very similar to the state stat-
utes. It provides that "when several claims are united . . . the court may
at any time order any of them to be severed or stayed, or order any of
the issues to be separately tried if they cannot conveniently be disposed of
or tried together." Id. at 18. Art. 10, § 10, is also similar; it provides for sep-
arate trials on issues arising out of counterclaims when this procedure is
convenient. Id. at 43.
9. This conclusion is brought out in the discussions on the Federal Rules
that took place before their adoption. Judge (then Dean) Clark stated in
these discussions that Rule 42(b) could be invoked to avoid prejudice or
inconvenience when a case became "cumbersome" due to the liberal joinder
rules. See ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL
RULES 273, 310 (1938); ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK INSTITUTE
ON THE FEDERAL RULES 277 (1938); ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL RULES 59, 73, 79-80, 118, 120 (1938).
10. See, e.g., Nettles v. General Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 234
F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1956); Hassett v. Modern Maid Packers, Inc., 23 F.R.D.
661 (D. Md. 1959); Rickenbacher Transp., Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 3
F.R.D. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
11. 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952), aff'd sub. nom., Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), 38 MINN. L. REV. 175 (1954). Rule 42(b)
may also be applied in multiparty litigation involving only a few parties.
In Nettles v. Central Ace. & Life Assur. Corp., 234 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.
1956), the court ordered a separate trial on liability in a negligence action
involving the consolidation of only three claims.
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cult for the court to decide. The cases in which separate trials on
issues have been ordered to avoid prejudice and inconvenience do
not appear to be numerous, however.
Another purpose of Rule 42(b) is to allow separate trials when
legal and equitable issues are combined in one action. 2 The Fed-
eral Rules provide for the merger of law and equity; nevertheless,
the distinction between legal and equitable issues is still relevant
because of the seventh amendment. 3 Accordingly, when claims
involving both legal and equitable issues have been presented, the
courts have ordered separate jury trials on legal issues while the
courts independently decided the equitable issues.' 4
Equity Rule 29 is also a basis for Rule 42(b). Thig rule gave
the judge discretion to hear and dispose of defenses "presentable
in bar or abatement" before trying the principal case." The
equity rule was employed by the courts to further the convenience
of the parties; thus, a separate trial on a defense could be ordered
only if a decision for the defendant on the issue would end the
litigation.'" The courts also have utilized Rule 42(b) to order
separate trials on specific case-determinative defenses. For exam-
ple, separate trials have been ordered on the defenses of the stat-
ute of limitations,'" the validity of a release,'" and laches.' 9 Such
12. Judge Clark stated that
the rules contemplate most extensive joinder, and safeguard all rights
by provisions for orders of separate trials, etc. Different form of trial
of different issues, e.g., one to the jury, another to the court, are a
normal feature of the procedure here contemplated.
ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF WASHINGTON INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL RULES
79-80 (1938).
13. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
14. E.g., Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1946); Hartford-
Empire Co. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 3 F.R.D. 50 (W.D. Pa. 1943).
15. The third sentence of Equity Rule 29 provided that
every defense heretofore presentable by plea in bar or abatement
shall be made in the answer and may be separately heard and dis-
posed of before the trial of the principal case in the discretion of the
court.
226 U.S. 656-57 (1912).
16. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Stanley Co., 38 F.2d 355 (D.
Del. 1930).
17. Smith v. Sperling, 237 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1956).
18. Bowie v. Sorrell, 209 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1953); Bedser v. Horton
Motor Lines, Inc., 122 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1941); Holt v. Granite City
Steel Co., 22 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Ill. 1957); Larsen v. Powell, 16 F.R.D. 322
(D. Colo. 1954).
19. The Seven-Up Co. v. O-So Grape Co., 177 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. Ill.
1959).
For other defenses upon which separate trials have been ordered, see
Carr v. Beverly Hills Corp., 237 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds, 354 U.S. 917 (1957) (jurisdiction); Canister Co. v. National Can
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a procedure benefits the parties because the time and expense of a
lengthy trial may be avoided. It is also a convenient practice for
the courts since court time will be saved when the defense is sus-
tained.20
While convenience of the court and parties is the usual reason
for ordering separate trials on issues, it is not the only reason. A
court may order a separate trial on an issue to avoid prejudicing
the defendant. This is one of the principal reasons advanced for a
separate trial to test the validity of a release allegedly signed by
the plaintiff in a personal injury case.2 Releases are often ob-
tained by insurance agents; from this many courts reason that the
defendant is prejudiced because the jury is made aware of his in-
surance. 2  Moreover, a jury may disregard the release issue in a
trial involving a grossly negligent defendant 23 or, conversely, it
may hold a defendant who was guilty of fraud in obtaining a re-
lease liable whether or not he was negligent.24 The release cases
appear to be the only instances where the courts have specifically
utilized Rule 42(b) to avoid prejudice, although the prejudice
that may result from extensive joinder may have influenced courts
to grant separate trials in multiparty litigation.
In summary, the courts have ordered separate trials on issues
Corp., 163 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1947) (statute of frauds); Drake v. Ming
Chi Shek, 155 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1957) (existence of fraud); Zenith
Radio Inc. v. Radio Corp. of America, 106 F. Supp. 561 (D. Del. 1952)
(validity of patents); Momand v. Paramount Pictures Distrib. Co., 6 F.R.D.
222 (D. Mass. 1946) (res judicata); Karolkiewicz v. City of Schenectady,
28 F. Supp. 343 (N.D.N.Y. 1939) (incapacity).
20. See Note, 39 MINN. L. REV. 743, 757 (1955).
21. Id. at 755-56.
22. In Larsen v. Powell, 16 F.R.D. 322 (D. Colo. 1954), the court
reasoned that it is practically impossible to prevent a jury from learning of
the defendant's insurance if the release issue is tried with the principal
case. It assumed that the jury's knowledge of the defendant's insurance is
prejudicial to him. The court rejected the argument that this prejudice
could be remedied by a jury instruction to disregard any reference to in-
surance. Id. at 324. Accord, Bowie v. Sorrell, 113 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Va.),
rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1953). But see Crockett
v. Boysen, 26 F.R.D. 148 (D. Minn. 1960), where the court held that a
separate trial should not be ordered on a release issue. The court rea-
soned that there is no prejudice in trying this issue with the principal case
because of the "simple reason that most jurors know that an insurance
company is involved in almost every personal injury action." Id. at 149.
23. See Ross v. Service Lines, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Ill. 1940),
where the court reasoned that the desire of the jury to render a verdict for
either party on the negligence issue may "cloud their judgment" as to the
release issue.
24. See Nesbitt v. Hauck, 15 F.R.D. 254, 256 (D.S.D. 1954), where
the court reasoned that to submit the fraud issue to the jury may "cause
them to minimize or almost wholly ignore the question of negligence
and plaintiff's right to recover damages."
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under Rule 42(b) in cases where the separation of an issue will
simplify an otherwise complex case, will separate legal and equit-
able issues, will involve a case-determinative defense, or will avoid
prejudice which might otherwise injure one party's position. Sig-
nificantly, Rule 42(b) was not designed to be liberally employ-
ed,2" and the courts have not ordered separate trials under Rule
42(b) except in rather isolated and unusual cases. The courts
have generally followed the rule that a lawsuit should not be tried
piecemeal 26-a philosophy adhered to in the Federal Rules.2"
B. RULE 21's EFFECT ON CURRENT PRACTICE
Rule 21 states that it is within the purview of Rule 42(b), but
it appears to change the current practice of granting separate
trials in the federal courts. The rule provides:
Pursuant to and in furtherance of Rule 42(b), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, to curtail undue delay in the administration of jus-
tice in personal injury and other civil litigation wherein the issue of
liability may be adjudicated as a prerequisite to the determination of
any or all other issues, in jury and non-jury cases, a separate trial
may be had upon such issue of liability, upon motion of any of the
parties or at the Court's direction, in any claim, cross-claim, counter-
claim, or third-party claim.
In the event liability is sustained, the trial on the remaining issues
shall proceed before the same jury, unless otherwise stipulated by the
parties.
The Court, however, may proceed to trial upon all or any combi-
nation of issues if, in its discretion, and in the furtherance of justice,
it shall appear that a separate trial will work a hardship upon any of
the parties or will result in protracted or costly litigation.28
25. This is illustrated by Judge Clark's comment that few people want
separate trials, "except in rather peculiar and special cases where it is
clear to everybody that they should be had." ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL RULES 59 (1938).
26. See Eichinger v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 20 F.R.D. 204, 207 (D.
Neb. 1957).
27. Judge Clark stated that the Rules are "based on the theory that it is
a sound and a desirable thing that all spots of irritation between the par-
ties should be brought out into the open and should be fought over and
disposed of at one time." ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
ON THE FEDERAL RULES 58 (1938). (Emphasis added.)
28. N.D. ILL. Civ. R. 21; 2 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 1048 (1960); 4
FED. RULES SERV. 2d 1136 (1961). The second paragraph of the rule origi-
nally provided:
In the event liability is sustained, the Court may recess for pre-
trial or settlement conference or proceed with the trial on any or all
of the remaining issues before the Court, before the same jury or be-
fore another jury as conditions may require and the Court shall deem
met.
2 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 1048 (1960).
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A comparison of Rule 42(b) and rule 21 reveals no direct con-
tradictions. Rule 21 does not appear to grant any more discretion
to the judge, nor does it require a judge to order a separate
trial in any case. Nevertheless, rule 21 does reflect a policy that
separate trials will be ordered in "routine" negligence cases,29 and
such a procedure is a substantial departure from the current prac-
tice under Rule 42(b) in the federal courts."
C. Is RULE 21 AUTHORIZED BY THE FEDERAL RULES?
Federal Rule 83 provides that a local rule must not be incon-
sistent with the Federal Rules.3 To be consistent with the Fed-
eral Rules, rule 21 cannot grant more discretion to the judges
than they have under Rule 42(b). 2 Rule 21, however, allows
the trial judge almost complete discretion in ordering separate
trials for routine negligence cases even though the courts have or-
dered separate trials in only rather extraordinary cases under Rule
42(b). But the failure to order separate trials in routine cases
under Rule 42(b) is not necessarily an absence of authority.
Rule 42(b) provides that a separate trial may be ordered on
any separate issue to "further convenience." The granting of a
separate trial on liability in negligence cases seems to come within
the rationale of those cases where convenience was furthered by
ordering a separate trial on case-determinative defenses since the
liability issue is also determinative of the case. Rule 42(b) states,
however, that a separate trial may be ordered only on a separate
issue, and the issues of liability and damages in negligence suits
29. The word "routine" is used to describe negligence cases which have
not become complex due to the extensive joining of parties or in which
special defenses are not raised. The author of rule 21 envisions separate
trials as a matter of course in most personal injury suits under the rule.
See Miner, supra note 3, at 1268; accord, Brault, supra note 4, at 800.
30. One federal judge (Judge Holtzoff) has employed a practice very
similar to an original separate trial on liability, however. In cases where he
feels that there is a great likelihood of a directed verdict he allows only
evidence of liability to come in. See ZIESEL, KALVEN & BUcKHOLZ,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 99-100 n.6.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 states that "each district court . . . may . . .
make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these
[Federal] Rules." (Emphasis added.)
32. Whether to grant a separate trial on an issue is within the sound
discretion of the district court; however, this discretion is not unlimited
and cannot be abused. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Williams, 245 F.2d
397, 404 (8th Cir. 1957); Bowie v. Sorrell, 209 F.2d 49, 51 (4th Cir .1953);
Shippers Pre-cooling Serv. v. Macks, 181 F.2d 510, 514 (5th Cir. 1950).
But the trial court's exercise of discretion will not be overturned unless it
is clearly abused. See The Seven-Up Co. v. O-So Grape Co., 177 F. Supp.
91, 93 (S.D. I1. 1959) (dictum).
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may be so intertwined that any rational separation is impossible.3
The courts have generally granted separate trials on case-deter-
minative defenses only when the issue is clearly separable-when
there would be no substantial duplication of witnesses and evi-
dence in a second trial."4 In many negligence cases, however,
there would be little duplication of evidence; moreover, separate
trials have been ordered when legal and equitable issues have been
combined in one action although this procedure often results in a
substantial repetition of evidence if a second trial is necessary.
Separate trials on liability and damages in negligence suits have
actually been ordered under Rule 42(b) in multiparty litigation.
Thus, the fact that the issues of liability and damages may not
be clearly separable in negligence suits does not foreclose the
ordering of separate trials in such cases under Rule 42(b).
Rule 42(b) also provides that a separate trial may be ordered
to "avoid prejudice," and rule 21 avoids the prejudice suffered
by a large number of defendants who are the apparent victims of
compromise verdicts.3 5 The prejudice which Rule 42(b) was ap-
parently designed to avoid was that which might result from the
extensive joinder of parties.36 However, separate trials have been
ordered to avoid prejudice in other situations, such as on the is-
sue of a release, 7 and rule 21 seems to fall within this "release
rationale."
Thus, despite the fact that the federal courts had not ordered
separate trials in routine negligence cases until the passage of
rule 21, this procedure seems to be authorized by the Federal
Rules.
33. See Weinstein, supra note 4, at 842. Cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Wiener, 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1961), where the court reasoned that when
punitive damages are demanded, the
question of damages is so interwoven with that of liability that the
former cannot be submitted to the jury independently of the latter
without confusion and uncertainty which would amount to a denial
of a fair trial.
Id. at 306.
34. See Fort Dodge Labs., Inc. v. Iowa Co-op. Ass'n, 147 F. Supp.
606 (S.D. Iowa 1956); Grissom v. Union Pac. R.R., 14 F.R.D. 263 (D.
Colo. 1953); McClain v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 10 F.R.D. 261 (S.D. Mo.
1950); Commercial Banking Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 1 F.R.D. 38
(E.D. Pa. 1940).
35. See Vogel, supra note 3, at 269.
36. See L. E. Whitham Const. Co. v. Remer, 105 F.2d 371, 377 (10th
Cir. 1939); Baker v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 11 F.R.D. 440 (S.D.N.Y.
1951). See also ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF WASHINGTON INSTITUTE ON THE
FEDERAL RULES 79, 120 (1938).
37. See notes 22-24 supra. The Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules appears to have envisioned a separate trial for a release when preju-
dice might result from a disclosure of insurance. See ABA, PROCEEDINGS
OF CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL RULES 273, 310 (1938).
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II. RULE 21'S EFFECT ON JURY DECISIONS
While rule 21 applies to nonjury as well as to jury trials, it
primarily affects personal injury cases, the majority of which are
tried before juries. In our legal system the jury is theoretically only
the trier of fact.33 Its function is to arrive at a verdict by applying
the law given in the court's instructions to the facts as it finds
them. The jury in practice, however, often seems to disregard the
court's instructions when contributory negligence is in issue. In-
stead, it will find for the plaintiff in the form of a reduced verdict
even though technically he is not entitled to recover." Such a
verdict is called a compromise verdict-a verdict derived by com-
paring the negligence of the parties and the gravity of the harm,
and then arriving at a reduced figure to offset the plaintiff's neg-
ligence4
There is little concrete evidence on why juries render compro-
mise verdicts; however, several factors, either individually or in
combination, probably account for these decisions. The jury has a
natural sympathy for the plaintiff's injuries" which may be very
important when the injuries are serious or the defendant is a large
corporation. Also, the doctrine that contributory negligence is a
complete bar to recovery may be contrary to jurors' ideas of fair-
ness. Most jurors apparently look on the compromise verdict as a
"fair" verdict as opposed to the legally correct verdict in which
the doctrine of contributory negligence is strictly applied. 2 The
difficulty of making a decision on the liability issue may also ac-
count for some compromise verdicts. In close cases the jury might
38. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIL 110 (1950); GREEN, JuDGE AND JURY
278-79 (1930); VANDERBILT, JUDGES AND JURORS 54-55 (1956).
39. See Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430, 281 N.W.
261, 263 (1938); ULmAN, A JUDGE TAKEs THE STAND 30-34 (1933); Pros-
ser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Micr. L. REv. 465, 469 (1953).
40. See Kalven, The Jury, the Law and the Personal Injury Damage
Award, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 158, 167 (1958). The compromise verdict has
also been defined as one in which some jurors have conceded liability
against their judgment in order to arrive at an agreement with the rest of
the jury. This concession is given in return for a reduction in damages.
See Murray v. Krenz, 94 Conn. 503, 508-09, 109 AUt. 859, 861. (1920);
Padayao v. Severence, 116 N.J.L. 385, 387-88, 184 Atl. 514, 515 (Sup.
Ct. 1936).
The Supreme Court has expressly noted the possibility that a jury may
manipulate its decision to reach a compromise verdict. Fairmont Glass
Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1933); accord,
Caloric Stove Corp. v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 205 F.2d 492, 497
(2d Cir. 1953).
41. See Vogel, supra note 3, at 269.
42. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1228-29 (1956); Thayer, Public
Wrong and Private Action, 27 HAuv. L. REv. 317, 340 & n.68 (1914);
Weinstein, supra note 4, at 832-33.
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reduce damages rather than make a complete finding for either
party. 3 It is relatively easy for juries to reduce damages to com-
pensate for the plaintiff's contributory negligence since they are
not usually required to explain how they determined the damages
awarded. A final factor that may affect the jury's verdict in this
regard is insurance. Most jurors are probably aware that defend-
ants generally have insurance, 4 and from this they may reason
that the insurance company can afford the loss better than the
plaintiff.45
The employment of rule 21 should reduce the number of com-
promise verdicts because a separate trial on liability would re-
duce the effect of most of the factors that influence a jury to ren-
der a compromise verdict. Sympathy for the plaintiff would be
reduced because only evidence concerning liability could be intro-
duced at the first trial. The jury would obviously be aware that
some kind of injury had been sustained, but the extent of the in-
jury would not be explained or demonstrated at length. Since the
only question before the jury would be liability, the jurors' ideas
on "fairness" may also be affected by the use of separate trials.
They might reason that it is not "fair" to give a plaintiff full re-
covery when he was contributorily negligent. The jury's ability to
reduce damages to provide the plaintiff with some compensation,
even though he was contributorily negligent, should be eliminated
by a separate trial on liability. Conceivably, a jury might realize
that it would be reimpaneled if a second trial is held on the is-
sue of damages, and for this reason they might find liability know-
ing that they could reduce damages at the second trial. But it is
doubtful whether jurors are this sophisticated.46 A separate trial
for liability would also force the jury to make a decision on lia-
bility factors in close cases; thus, the compromise verdict may be
reduced in these cases. The only factor that would not be affected
by rule 21 is insurance, and insurance probably is not enough, by
itself, to influence a jury to render a compromise verdict. It would
seem that insurance would result in a complete finding for the
plaintiff rather than a compromise verdict if jurors were to con-
sider this factor important in awarding damages. In summary,
rule 21's use would probably have a substantial effect on the num-
ber of compromise verdicts.
43. See VANDERBILT, op. cit. supra note 38, at 57.
44. See Crockett v. Boysen, 26 F.R.D. 148, 149 (D. Minn. 1960);
SchevIing v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 87, 89-90 (D. Conn. 1953), afj'd, 213
F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1954).
45. See Kalven, supra note 40, at 171.
46. But see Weinstein, supra note 4, at 849.
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Presumably any rule that would reduce the number of compro-
mise verdicts is desirable because the compromise verdict is not
recognized by the law." Indeed, many devices such as summary
judgments, directed verdicts, and the exclusionary rules of evi-
dence are employed by the courts partly to diminish the oppor-
tunities of compromise verdicts. 8
Some commentators feel that compromise verdicts serve a use-
ful function in our legal system, however, and therefore any rule
which reduces them is considered undesirable. 9 A principal rea-
son advanced for preserving the jury system in civil actions is that
the jury reflects the community's view on the law. 0 The com-
promise verdict may thus be defensible because it represents the
layman's verdict as opposed to a logical, legally-proper decision.
But, if this is true our theory of contributory negligence needs to
be revised. Such a basic revision of the law should be made by
the legislature; it should not be made by the courts. Hence, it
seems improper to give the compromise verdict implied recogni-
tion by refusing to adopt rule 21 because it would reduce compro-
mise verdicts. It seems somewhat anomalous to have the doctrine
of contributory negligence expounded by the courts and disre-
garded by the juries. Rule 21 may be desirable, therefore, simply
because it does put the issue of contributory negligence versus
comparative negligence squarely before the public."'
III. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTION TO RULE 21
The constitutional attack on rule 21 is that, insofar as it af-
fects the jury system, the rule violates the seventh amendment.2
The seventh amendment provides:
47. E.g., Schuerholz v. Roach, 58 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1932); Haeg v.
Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430, 281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938).
48. See James, Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-Control Devices
Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REv. 218 (1961). See generally id. at
218-48.
49. At least two commentators on rule 21 have taken this position. See
Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of
the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REV. 831
(1961); Brault, Should the Issues of Liability and of Damages in Tort
Cases Be Separated for the Purposes of Trial?, 1960 INS. L.J. 798.
50. See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 123 (1881); James, supra note
48, at 247.
51. For an example of a proposed "model" comparative negligence stat-
ute, see Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 465, 508
(1953).
52. See generally 74 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1961); 49 ILL. B.J. 424 (1961);
36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 388 (1961); 48 VA. L. REv. 99 (1962). The fact
that rule 21 may be pursuant to and not inconsistent with Rule 42(b) does
not foreclose consideration of its constitutionality, for the Supreme Court
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In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall ex-
ceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.
The essence of the constitutional argument is that the amendment
preserves the right to have one jury consider both liability and
damages at the same time because this was the practice in England
when the amendment was adopted in 1791." The validity of
this constitutional objection thus turns upon what features of the
right to trial by jury the seventh amendment actually preserves. 4
Prior to the adoption of the seventh amendment, the oppo-
nents of the Constitution strongly objected to the lack of a guar-
antee of a jury trial in civil cases; they argued that giving the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction "both as to Law and Fact"55
would destroy the institution of trial by jury in civil cases.5 6 The
seventh amendment was passed, at least in part, to meet this ob-
jection;5" thus, the amendment clearly preserves the right to
have facts tried by a jury re-examined by a court only according
to the rules of the common law.5" The amendment may have pre-
served more than this, however. Mr. Justice Story maintained that
the amendment "secured the right of a trial by jury in civil
cases in the fullest latitude of the common law." 59
At common law the parties had a right to a unanimous verdict
of twelve :jurors in the presence and under the superintendence of
a judge having powers to instruct them as to the law and advise
(not direct) them as to the facts.6" The common law consider-
has said that "the fact that this Court promulgated the rules . . . does not
foreclose consideration of their validity." Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946).
53. The common law referred to in the amendment is the common
law of England as of 1791. Therefore, to determine which rules are to
be applied to which suits, the courts must consult the English common law
of 1791. See Baltimore & C. Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657
(1935).
54. The amendment preserves the right to trial by jury, not the jury
trial itself. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899).
55. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2(2).
56. See 2 STORY, CONSTITUTION 523-26 (4th ed. 1873). These fears
were probably groundless in view of the intent of the framers; nevertheless,
the lack of a guarantee of a jury in civil trials almost prevented ratification
of the Constitution. Id. at 523.
57. Id. at 526.
58. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830).
59. 2 STORY, op. cit. supra note 56, at 526; accord, RAWLE, A VIEw OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 135 (2d ed. 1829); Parsons
v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830).
60. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899).
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ed both the issue of liability and the amount of damages to be jury
questions."' These issues were usually considered at the same time
by the same jury, but it is not clear that the common law required
this procedure.
Although there do not appear to be any cases dealing with the
granting of separate trials for liability and damages prior to 1873,
separate trials on separate issues were not completely unknown to
the common law. The action at law of account-render called for
separate trials on whether a defendant-trustee was liable for an
accounting, and if he was, how much was owing.62 There is no
evidence that account-render was prohibited by the common-law
courts at any time.63 The Judicature Rules of 1873 also reflect
the existence of separate trials on issues at common law. One
of these rules authorized separation of issues at the trial level,6
and there is some indication that the Judicature Rules merely
codified existing practice. 65 Thus, separate trials on issues were
apparently neither unknown nor prohibited at common law, and,
therefore, there seems to have been no absolute right in 1791 to
have one jury consider all the issues of a case at one time.
Even if the common law would not have approved of separate
trials on issues, the Supreme Court has not always adhered to Mr.
Justice Story's interpretation that the amendment "secured the
right of a trial by jury in civil cases in the fullest latitude of the
common law." The Court has developed the doctrine that the con-
stitutional conception of a jury trial is not inflexible in all details
as long as the essential elements of the institution are preserved.
The Court reasoned that since the Constitution is concerned with
substance, not form,66 the aim of the seventh amendment "is not
to preserve mere matters of form and procedure but substance of
right."87 Under this doctrine,
all of vital significance in trial by jury is that issues of fact be sub-
mitted for determination with such instructions and guidance by the
61. See Smyth Sales, Inc. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 141 F.2d
41, 44 (3d Cir. 1944).
62. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 164 (Tucker ed. 1803); Mayers, The
Severance for Trial of Liability from Damage, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 389,
391-93 (1938). This action was available about 1700 in every case where
money was received by a trustee or person in a similar position.
63. The action apparently fell into disuse because of the development of
the equitable action for account which had procedural advantages. Ibid.
64. SUPREME COURT OF JuDicATmnE RULES, Order XXXVI, rule 8(1883).
65. See Snelling v. Pulling, 29 Ch. D. 85, 87 (1885); MacDonald v.
The Tacquah Gold Mines Co., 13 Q.B.D. 535, 539 (1884).
66. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931).
67. Walker v. New Mexico & So. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897).
1962] NOTES 1071
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1059
court as will afford opportunity for that consideration by the jury
which was secured by the rules governing trials at common law.
68
The seventh amendment does not unalterably preserve the English
law of 1791 or inhibit the introduction of procedural reform. 69
The Supreme Court has applied this doctrine in holding that a
federal court may constitutionally appoint auditors to hear testi-
mony and examine books, and then report upon such issues of
fact as an aid to the jury in arriving at its verdict;" the court
may require both a general and a special verdict, and then di-
rect a verdict for the defendant on the basis of the facts specially
found;7 and appellate courts may accept only that part of a ver-
dict which declares that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, and re-
mand for retrial only those issues that were incorrectly decided.
72
None of these procedures was known at common law, but they
were held constitutional because their employment changed only
form and did not interfere with the substantive right to have a
jury make all fact determinations.
This form-substance distinction was relied upon to uphold the
constitutionality of rule 21 in the two cases in which the rule was
challenged. In the first case, O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Trans.
Co.,7s the trial court reasoned that the rule was clearly constitu-
68. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931);
accord, Baltimore & C. Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935):
[Tihe aim of the Amendment . . . is to preserve the substance of
the common-law right of trial by jury, as distinguished from mere
matters of form or procedure, and particularly to retain the common-
law distinction between the province of the court and that of thejury, whereby, in the absence of express or implied consent to the
contrary, issues of law are to be resolved by the court and issues of
fact are to be determined by the jury under appropriate instructions
by the court.
69. But see Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935), where the
Court stated that "in order to ascertain the scope and meaning of the
Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate rules of the
common law established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional
provision in 1791." Accord, Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank v. Chicago, R.I.
& Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 669 (1935), where the Court, in dictum,
stated that the guarantee of the seventh amendment "has always been con-
strued to mean a trial in the mode and according to the settled rules of
the common law, including all the essential elements recognized in this
country and England when the Constitution was adopted."
In Dimick, the Court held that a trial judge could not increase the
amount of damages awarded by a jury since such a practice was not sanc-
tioned by the common law. Dimick v. Schiedt, supra at 482. Since Dimick,
however, the form-substance line of reasoning has been reaffirmed in Gallo-
way v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-96 (1943).
70. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309 (1920).
71. Walker v. New Mexico & So. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593 (1897).
72. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
73. 183 F. Supp. 577, 585-86 (N.D. 1ll. 1960).
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tional since only form was changed; a jury would ultimately pass
upon all the fact issues. The same reasoning was employed in
Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,74 where the Seventh Circuit stated
that under rule 21 "the essential character of a trial by jury was
preserved." In both decisions the courts relied principally upon the
case of Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co.75 to sustain
constitutionality.
In Gasoline Products, the Court, relying on the form-substance
distinction, overturned the common-law rule76 that an error as
to one issue in a trial resulted in a second trial of all issues; in-
stead, it sanctioned a retrial of only that issue which had been in-
correctly decided in the trial court. The Court has thus, in effect,
approved of separate trials on separate issues, for the difference
between remanding an issue for retrial and an original trial on a
single issue is merely form.77 Because the Court has sanctioned
separate trials on separate issues, however, does not mean that
rule 21 is constitutional.7" In Gasoline Products, the Court stated
that one issue could be sent back to be tried before a different
jury only when "it clearly appears that the issue to be retried is so
distinct and separable from the others that a trial of it alone
may be had without injustice";79 thus, a separate trial on is-
sues has been sanctioned only when the issues are distinct and
74. 282 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814
(1961), 74 HAzv. L. REv. 781 (1961).
75. 283 U.S. 494 (1931). While the Seventh Circuit in Hosie upheld the
procedure of separate trials on issues of liability and damages, it stated
that if two juries were involved a difficult constitutional issue under the
seventh amendment would be presented. It is difficult to follow the court's
reasoning on this point for the principal case relied upon to sustain sep-
arate trials, Gasoline Products, involved two juries. If Gasoline Products
sanctions separate trials on the issues, it also sanctions the employment
of different juries on each issue. For the text of the original rule 21
which sanctioned the use of two juries, see 2 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 1048-
49 (1960).
76. Parker v. Godin, 2 Str. 813, 93 Eng. Rep. 866 (K.B. 1755); Bond
v. Spark, 12 Mod. 275, 88 Eng. Rep. 1318 (K.B. 1702); McKeon v. Cen-
tral Stamping Co., 264 Fed. 385 (3d Cir. 1920).
77. It could be argued, however, that Gasoline Products does not sup-
port rule 21 because the remanding of a separate issue for retrial is not
clearly analogous to an original separate trial on that issue. In Gasoline
Products the plaintiff had received an opportunity for a compromise ver-
dict in the first trial. The courts should not be required to take notice of
this distinction, however, for the compromise verdict is not generally rec-
ognized. Moreover, the Court in Gasoline Products said any issue could
be separately retried. Thus, although the issue usually retried alone is dam-
ages-and therefore the plaintiff has received the benefit of a possible
compromise verdict-this would not seem to prevent the court from only
remanding the liability issue.
78. See Weinstein, supra note 49, at 842.
79. 283 U.S. at 500.
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separable. Gasoline Products involved a contract action, and the
issues sent back were damages and the validity of a counterclaim;
but the issues of liability and damages may not be as distinct and
separable in negligence cases because damages are often adjusted
in compromise verdicts.8 Some of the courts of appeals,
however, have approved of separate trials for liability and dam-
ages in negligence suits involving multiparty litigation."- If the
issues are constitutionally separable in such cases, no good rea-
son is apparent why they should not be constitutionally separ-
able in all negligence cases. Moreover, the compromise verdict is
not generally recognized by the courts or law.
It seems clear that the intent of the framers of the seventh
amendment was to preserve the institution of trial by jury because
the jury trial was considered an effective instrument in the ad-
ministration of justice. 2 If the institution is to continue to be ef-
fective, it must be capable of adapting to the needs of the present
and of the future.83 The rights under the seventh amendment
have been preserved by the Federal Rules, 4 which indicates that
the Supreme Court in promulgating the Federal Rules did not view
Rule 42(b) as a radical departure from prior practice. Even if
the submitting of issues in separate trials is considered a departure
from the common-law use of jury trials, it must be viewed in con-
junction with present needs. If trial by jury is to have any mean-
ing, it should be trial by jury within a reasonable time after the
filing of a lawsuit, and the objective of rule 21 is to reduce delay
in the courts. 5 Assuming this objective is fulfilled, the rule should
be held to be merely form and not violative of the seventh amend-
ment.
CONCLUSION
The reception of rule 21 by the courts has been mixed. The
80. See 33 NoTRE DAME LAW. 129, 131 (1957); cf. United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1961).
81. See notes 10 & 11 supra. These cases may not be controlling on
this point, however, since there is no indication that the constitutional is-
sue was raised.
82. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830).
83. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920); Scott, Trial by
Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARv. L. Rnv. 669, 691(1918).
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
85. One commentator who has done extensive research in the area of
delay in the courts has predicted that rule 21 will "save at least 20 per
cent of the court's trial time." Zeisel, The Jury and the Court Delay,
in 328 ANNALS 46, 52 (1960). For an excellent analysis of the various fac-
tors that must be considered in determining whether rule 21 wil actually
reduce delay, see Weinstein, supra note 49, at 844-52; Note, 46 IowA
L. REV. 815, 819-25 (1961).
1074
Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia has voted to reject
a similar rule; after recently adopting a similar plan, the Supreme
Court of New York County silently abandoned it. The Texas Su-
preme Court has refused to allow separate trials in routine negli-
gence litigation despite the fact that Texas has a rule identical to
Rule 42(b). On the other hand, the Appellate Divisions of both
New York and Illinois have not only approved of separate trials in
unusual cases, but they have also impliedly approved of this pro-
cedure in routine cases. While it is not clear whether rule 21 will
reduce delay in the courts, it is clear that the courts have an obli-
gation to make an effort in this direction. In many jurisdictions
court calendars are as much as three years behind. To meet
this problem, the courts should experiment with new proced-
ures. If rule 21 is not acceptable, it would seem that the courts
have an obligation to come up with an alternative solution. Per-
haps, Judge Holtzoff's procedure-requiring the plaintiff in
doubtful cases to prove liability and, if he survives a motion for
a directed verdict, then proceed to the issue of damages-is a
more desirable solution. However, it seems likely that the trial
judge would have difficulty in determining the probable validity
of the plaintiff's claim before he has actually heard the testimony.
Any procedural remedy must, in any case, preserve the fundament-
al rights of the parties. Rule 21 preserves these rights and may
well be a partial solution to the delay in the courts problem.
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